CHAPTER V
AN ASSESSMENT OF CULTURE, RELIGION AND MINORITY GROUPS AS THEY RELATE TO NATIONAL IDENTITY - NATIONAL UNITY

The parameters of this study include three distinct sociological factors that affect the development of National Identity-National Unity. They are 1) Forces within Israeli culture affecting NI-NU; 2) The contribution of Religion to NI-NU; and 3) The relationship of Minority Groups to NI-NU. The comments of the primary personnel will be presented within the context of related literature reviewed by the researcher.

Forces Within Israeli Culture Affecting NI-NU

In interviews with two of the primary personnel the statement was made, "Israeli culture is a mixed culture." One, a prominent author in the field of adult literacy programs, went on to explain, "People came to Israel from many different cultures. First we tried to give them all the good things we had developed, to make them 'like us'. Then we found that you cannot change people by giving them material things." This supports what a former Director of Adult Education (in the Ministry of Education) said: "It is very hard to say we have a whole culture, or a pluralistic culture. It is only 30 years! We can only trace what we call 'Israeli culture' to a historical traditional Jewish culture. And that traditional Jewish culture is very deeply rooted in religion." Another adult educator concurred by saying, "I see religion as part of our culture - our way of life. It
was for many generations a religion, but it has also become a culture."

A fourth said: "For me it is very simple, the Bible is our culture."

Sociologist Sammy Smooha defined culture for the researcher as "the rules of the game - how people relate to one another and compete with one another." He added:

The Israeli culture is a mixed culture. It is not exactly a western country although it has some western elements and some Jewish traditions and some local sabra elements mixed together. There are very few western Jews in Israel. Most of the Ashkenazi Jews are from Eastern Europe... the Jewish traditions of Israel in the public domain are more accustomed to Ashkenazi styles (ie. in worship, dress etc.) than to Oriental. Also the majority of the local traditions of the sabras are Ashkenazi traditions. If you set the rules of the game according to Ashkenazi values, you make it easier for them to compete and harder for the Oriental Jews."  

The Director of the Israeli Community Centers noted that "prior to 1948, Israel was a predominantly western culture built on the ideology of socialism, the labor movement, modernism and a society built on achievements. Those who lacked this knowledge were not able to keep up or manage." The majority of the newly arrived immigrants, admitted to what a Histadrut leader called "the cultural supremacy of the resident Israeli. The ones who came from Yemen or Kurdistan, sensed the supremacy of the 'old timers' in Israel but did not understand, nor know what it was."  

Two of the factors creating this situation of cultural supremacy by the Ashkenazi Jews in the early days of the state were:
1) the Zionist pioneers living in Israel were accepted as 'leaders';
2) the newly arrived immigrants were economically dependent on the veteran settlers. One leader of adult education within the Moshavim
It is a complex job to get people to absorb within a new culture. Adults carry with them both positive and negative cultural heritage factors. The culture of an adult is his 'I', his Identity. An adult does not want to give up his 'I'. (10)

The same leader tried to sum up the feelings of the new immigrants he worked with by the following observation:

It was difficult in 1948 for the newly arrived immigrants to understand the European local culture. They emulated only the margins of it. Yet twenty-five years later in 1973, these immigrants began to straighten their backs. They and their second generation children are now in a position to select what they want. They are not on the edges any more as mere emulators or newcomers. They can now speak for themselves and express their desires. (11)

This view would support a quote Frank Epp received in his interviews with 96 Israelis.

The policy of the government now is not to press for immediate cultural integration into the country. And therefore we encourage the immigrants to have their own newspapers in their own languages and to set up their own folklore groups thus allowing the gradual formation of a new culture in Israel. It will take at least two or three generations until there is an Israeli culture. (12)

Grabelsky, as an adult educator, sees a danger in this 'theory of slow natural integration'. She says,

Adult education is important in Israel because we don't have time...if someone can say, 'I didn't get the job because I'm from Morocco and I am not educated,' then we must close the (educational) gap if we are to have unity. And we must close it quickly. We cannot wait. (13)

It appears the early thrust among adult educators contained a sense of urgency for integration. However, one of the 'veterans' of adult
Many good people thought naively that the job of cultural absorption was an easy job, but it was a difficult job - a complex job - it takes time to help people absorb." 14

Smooha commented to the researcher that Oriental Jews feel their cultural heritage is being overlooked, thus causing an alienation towards the emerging Israeli (ie. Ashkenazi) culture. In the early 1960's there was the beginning of an organized attempt by the Israeli government to maintain an 'Oriental heritage' of Oriental traditions. Smooha affirms that "the national dream is to mix all Jews into one culture" but admits that since 1960 there has been some relaxation of the cultural dominance of the Ashkenazi Jew. 15 He identified for the researcher three problems related to developing an Israeli culture. They are: 1) The problem of participation. How can the Orientals be full partners in the development of a truly Israeli culture? 2) The problem of paternalism. In the mind of the Ashkenazi, the Oriental is perceived as under-developed. This was noted in detail by one adult educator who said:

You notice that I use the word developed and under-developed and deliberately avoid the word Ashkenazi and Sephardic. It is not correct to use the word Ashkenazi to define a group for the word only means those immigrants who came from Germany. There are many who came from Holland and from Spain in 1492 who would be classified Sephardic. The word Sephardic means 'from Spain'. So you have Jews who came from South America who are partly Sephardic and partly Ashkenazi. If you say 'east' and 'west', these terms are incorrect for Morocco is both West - and East. The only correct term is to say a person came from a very developed or from an under-developed country. And even when you say a Jew came from an under developed country he was often among the most highly educated people in that country because of the needs of the synagogue. When
they came here and found they were 'under
developed' it was a shock for they had been
among the highest in their country. (16)

Smooha notes that a stereotype of the Oriental Jew exists that causes him to be regarded as less talented than the Ashkenazi. Whenever the dominant culture defines the remaining portion of the population as 'culturally deprived', that is what Smooha refers to as 'paternalism';

3) The problem of class structure. The stereotype of the Orientals is that they have less education, less skills, a lower standard of living and larger families. While this may be partially true it underestimates the severity of what Smooha calls 'The Institutionalization of Ethnic Stratification'. This is developed in more detail in Appendix H, but it is noteworthy that certain adult educators, verified Smooha's observations in their interviews. They said:

There is a certain division within society according to these lines (Ashkenazi-Oriental). Unfortunately the socio-economic division is also characterized by the 'origin' division. (17)

The most severe and critical problem in adult education in Israel is the difference in ethnic backgrounds between the Ashkenazi: (mainly European and American Jews who spoke Yiddish) who represent the elite Jews in Israel, the economic leaders, army, politicians, who are on the top of the pyramid, and the Sephardic/Oriental Jews: mainly from Muslim countries who speak Arabic or Spanish or Ladino who represent the 'working class majority' at the bottom of the pyramid - one level above the Israeli Arabs and the Palestinian Arabs. (18)

There is among the Sephardic Jews a lot of adult education that is not aimed at NI-NU but rather in terms of cultural depravation or disadvantaged. The Sephardic Jews are regarded economically and socially as being at the bottom of the ladder. (19)
Social worker Bernard Resnikoff sees the cultural disparity between Ashkenazi and Oriental Jews as a fact of history - during a period of transition. He is quoted by Epp as saying:

With respect to Jews from Oriental countries it is true that they are second-class citizens, but...The 'but' has to do with moderation, it has to do with legislation, it has to do with intent. I don't know of any formal or institutional design to make the Jews of Oriental countries second-class citizens. They are the majority in the country... and if there are any ways in which they are second-class citizens, it's a function of history. By this I mean that the Jews of Oriental countries have come to a highly technological society, twentieth century in its orientation, political system and technology, a society which requires a sophisticated knowledge of how to live in a democratic pluralistic system. These people have come from underdeveloped countries, and they have never acquired the technical skill to make their way in a technological society. They are thrust, overnight, from the sixteenth century into the twentieth. This is a pretty tough assignment. If you find more Jews of Western origin in seats of power than Jews of Eastern origin, I think it is a consequence of the historical fact more than anything else. (20)

Centuries of Jewish dispersion is the historical fact that has caused the ethnic evolution of three branches of Jews - each tending to resemble the Gentiles of their country of residence - Orientals, Sephardim and Ashkenazim. Adult educators since 1948 have been seeking out the common Jewish elements from which to forge a unique Israeli culture. Kodesh kept repeating to the researcher, "It is only 30 years!" Canada is over 100 years old. The United States is over 200 years old. Traditional Jewish culture is over 2,000 years old. It is most likely that Israeli NI-NU will be built upon that ancient culture. It takes time - but the process is under way.
The Contribution of Religion to NI-NU in Israel

'Religion and its Role in National Integration in Israel' is the title of an article written by Emanuel Gutman, in the Fall, 1979 issue of Middle East Review. Religion was a topic that frequently emerged in conversations with the primary personnel, as they sought to assess its contribution to NI-NU. There is a continuum of religiosity within Israel, from the extreme secular/atheistic/Marxist/non-observant Jew - who might still talk about the 'religion of work' or 'faith in the people', to the opposite extreme Toraic/ritualistic/ultra-Orthodox/observant Jew - who seeks to 'sanctify the name of G-D'. Gutman observes:

"In terms of modern national ideology based on the secular conception of national Jewish Identity...one would have to say that the Jews have always been a mono-religious people...and it implies that most Israelis today accept the notion that being Jewish (including Israeli Jewish) has at least something to do with the Jewish religion. Only a tiny minority claim that in the totality of Judaism, religion has - or ought to have - no part at all." (23)

The researcher asked Ben-Sason, what terms best describe the variation of approaches to religion by Jewish people in Israel. He replied, "The obvious division is 'religious' and 'non-religious' although there are other divisions within each term (ie. the Orthodox divide into Ultra-Orthodox and the National Religious Jews)." His two-fold division will be referred to in this section but as Gutman notes:

"It may be a gross over-simplification to speak of two population sectors, the"
religious and the non-religious, in Israel
(just as it is wrong to reduce all social
problems to the Ashkenazi-Sephardi
cleavage), for in both sectors, the
religious and non-religious, there are ample
internal divisions, fissions and
dissentions. (25)

By Smooha's definitions of the terms 30 percent of the Israeli Jews are
classified as 'religious' and 70 percent are 'non-religious'. 26 He
states:

Religious Jews in the Israeli context, are
Orthodox Jews; namely Jews who accept the
authority of halacha as divine law and do their
best to observe it in their daily life. This
definition of who is a religious Jew in Israel
turns all non-religious Jews into a residual
category of atheists, secularists, traditionalists,
Conservative or Reform Jews, and others who reject
the authority of halakha...As a rough estimate,
people who maintain a non-secular lifestyle
constitute 75 percent of the Jewish population,
people who observe Orthodox practices 30
percent, and people who are organizationally or
politically affiliated with the religious sector
only 15 percent. (27)

Epp discerned from his interviews, "(When) a specific interpretation of
religion is understood, it becomes quite evident that even so-called non-
religious Jews are actually religious...the new expression of Judaism is
Israel for many Jews. Nationalism is itself a religion." 28

Given the wide spectrum of religious belief in Israel, the
question that relates to this study is "What constitutes the 'religion'
of National Identity-National Unity?" Many of the adult educators who
became the primary personnel for this study would identify themselves as
'traditional' or 'secular' Jews. A few were 'Orthodox'. This may
account for the wide variety of views about the role of religion in NI-NU
as seen in the following quotes:
Extreme religious Jews have always existed in Israel, reading in the same material, studying in the same manner as they have for centuries in their closed communities. They look upon their presence in the land of Israel as fulfilling for them their 'career of study' - to study Torah. Until the state was formed, the 'State' was the Jewish educational system from nursery to Yeshiva...Learning contributed to survival and identity as a Jew. (29)

Jewishness is more than a religion. In Israel people live together with their common roots. In the USA they asked me if I was religious. I said, 'I think more than every one of you. In Israel I do not have to have a synagogue to identify myself as a Jew, because my holidays are Jewish, and my language is Jewish, and my literature is Jewish and my history in every stone in Jerusalem tells me stories about my fathers. When we have 'succoth' (30) everyone keeps part of succoth, even the non-observant Jew. On shabbat, everyone keeps shabbat. (31)

The Jewish religion is not 'just a religion'. It has national connotations. It is sometimes very difficult to separate the 'religious' from the 'national'. It is the 'Jewish way of life'. (32)

Nearly all adult education departments have a religious department. These religious policy makers try to encourage National Identity in their studies, but they are mainly interested in 'quality of life' rather than in National Identity. (33)

I see Jewish Identity in the Bible and the scriptures and the Jewish culture. The Bible is a source of our culture. I see religion as part of our culture - our way of life...we teach the Bible in a humanistic way, not in a nationalistic way nor a religious way. (34)

The Bible is studied in this country in many cases not as a religious document but as a historical document...The Bible seems destined to become a common denominator for Jewish history and historical development. (35)

The Bible is a valid factor in building both Identity and unity...it is part of the
'symbol system'. All Jews identify with the Bible. Most of the symbols which unite people are religious symbols, holy days etc. The symbols have been secularized however and perceived differently by the non religious Jew. (36)

The basic religious foundations of all the Jews is the same but the customs of the Jewish people may be different...it is our desire to be fair to the different cultural backgrounds in the development of a religious or cultural pluralism. (37)

Religious Jews will emphasize the 'Jewish' aspect of National Identity. The non-religious Jews will emphasize the 'Israeli' aspect of his National Identity. The Israeli element is secular, and local and indigenous. The Jewish element is religious and traditional and worldwide. The secular Jews have failed to produce a secular National Jewish Identity. So the National Identity of the country is more of a religious identity. (38)

Religious people - and this is my personal view - have less problems identifying with Israel. They do not have to adopt a Jewish Identity. They know what to do and what not to do. They have the book of commands. The problem of Identity is for the secular Jews. (39)

In many ways it is easier for a Jew to be Orthodox and be practising abroad. Here he has to run a modern state. How do you run an electric company on Shabbat? - or an Air Force? (40)

There are thousands of Jews who come to Israel, who know little about Judaism (ie Russian immigrants) They are called 'secular', but they are Jewish. The world calls them Jewish and they have a sense of Jewish Identity but little background in Jewish religion or culture. How to embody their Jewish Identity with content so they feel integrated is our challenge. (41)

This selection of comments by the primary personnel indicates that NI-NU requires some form of 'Jewish consciousness'. A former Director of the Department of Adult Education said:
The base point is the 'Declaration of Independence' that says Israel is a Jewish State...even though there is freedom of religion without discrimination...while wanting to be a democratic, modern, free society, pluralistic in the sense of making it possible for various cultures and religions to survive, and live along side one another, but at the same time clearly recognize that the state as a state should have an obvious Jewish character so there is purpose in creating the state and a purpose to the Zionist endeavor. (42)

Building that 'obvious Jewish character' presents a formidable challenge for non religious Israeli adult educators. They must develop a secular substitute for the religious aspects of Jewish identity. While 'Jewishness' is admittedly 'more than a religion', it must first be recognized for what it is as a religion. When the ancient Psalmist, King David, said "Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord" (Psalm 32:12) he entwined Jewish National Identity with Jewish Religious Identity. This may be why some of the primary personnel felt 'religious Jews' have an easier time identifying with Israel.

Adult educators in Israel could be likened to a mid-wife assisting in the 'birth' of a Jewish/Israeli National Identity. Whether the 'child' is born religious or nonreligious is left to a 'higher power' to decide.

The Relationship of Minority Groups to NI-NU in Israel

Within Israeli Society there are two classifications of 'minority groups': Jewish minority groups and non-Jewish minority groups. Jewish minority groups are recognized citizens of Israel who possess views or act in a manner that is considered by many to be a direct challenge to National Identity-National Unity. Two of these groups
actively oppose the idea of a Jewish state. At the one extreme are the Canaanites ('the quintessential secularists') and at the other are N'ture Karta ('the quintessential religionists'). Herman notes:

When the Jewish and Israeli subidentities are perceived as overlapping and consonant as a 'wholeness' in Erikson's terms, the Jewish subidentity is strong and so is the Israeli subidentity. When there is this overlap, the Jewishness is suffused with Israeliness, and the Israeliness is suffused with Jewishness. The one gathers strength from the other. Where they are separated, a weakening of the Jewishness becomes evident. Taken to its extremes, the sundering of Jewishness and Israeliness leads into the paths pursued by two small fringe groups - at opposite poles from one another - in the life of Israel. The one group are the so-called Canaanites who wish to see an Israeliness completely divorced from the Jewish people and from the Jewish past in the Diaspora. The other group are the N'ture Karta ('Guardians of the Walls') who see themselves only as Jews and not as Israelis, and who do not 'recognize' the existence of the 'profane' State of Israel. (44)

The Canaanite Movement is composed of primarily writers and intellectuals who declare an attachment to the land of Israel, but disavow any connection with Judaism. Zionism and World Jewry. The Director of the Martin Buber Center for Adult Education described them in the following manner:

In short it is a group of people who say, consciously or unconsciously, "We are a nation. We are not Jewish. We are a new people - Hebrew or Israeli. We want to go back to our roots in the time of the Bible and develop the 'Land of Canaan'. If Jews want to come back to this land, that is fine, but anybody can come. All people living in Israel should be regarded as Israelis. Religion is a component of our roots but not that important. Religion should be a personal and a private manner. (45)
The Canaanite Movement is particularly attractive to Israeli born citizens ('sabras'), especially young people. A former Head of the Department of Adult Education referred to the movement as 'extremists' but noted, "a bit of the Canaanite philosophy will be found in other segments of society - Ben-Gurion was a supporter of the Canaanite Movement." 46 By 1972, 20.4 percent of the total world population of Jews lived in Israel, 79.6 percent lived in the Diaspora. 47 Although the Canaanite Movement can be viewed by some as an internal identity crisis by Israeli born 'extremists', it must be recognized that after 24 years of extended invitations, and 'Laws of Return', almost 80 percent of the world Jewish community have chosen to live outside of Israel. This has prompted some Israeli born citizens to forget the Zionist goal of a Jewish state, and seek to build a new society of Jews, Christians and Muslims together in a secular, democratic society. For the Canaanites, National Identity and National Unity is to be found in a new Israeli society.

At the other extreme are the N'ture Karta (meaning: 'Guardians of the Walls'). These are a thousand or so Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem who believe in a Messianic redemption only. They believe you cannot have a state without a Messiah and - since Messiah has not yet arrived - they consider the secular Jewish state an aberration. 48 A poster (in English) painted on a wall in Mea Shearim (an ultra-Orthodox community in Jerusalem) states unequivocally, 'Judaism and Zionism are diametrically opposed.' 49 This minority group regards National Identity as a spiritual identity with historical Judaism until the coming of Messiah. Only then will there be true NI-NU. Although
both of these extremist groups are tiny in number, their presence indicates the range of political-religious attitudes in which adult educators seek to achieve NI-NU.

A third minority group, different in nature from the previous two, are the Israeli Jewish citizens who emigrate from Israel. From 1948-1975 it is estimated that 215,000 Jews emigrated from Israel. Although the rate of emigration was low between 1969 and 1973 (1.6 per 1,000) it was higher after the waves of immigration in 1949-1951 when the conditions in the land were somewhat primitive and difficult for the new immigrants. Statistics were not available up to the end of the period under study (1973) so the above statistics include the years immediately after the Yom Kippur War, when emigration again increased.

One of the primary personnel offered the following reasons for why there is a flow of people out of the country.

1) We are not educating people in the meaning of Jewish values or Israeli values. Education is not a strong factor. If we are convinced that proper values were being taught then people would be convinced and would not be leaving. Israel has been an agricultural pioneer society for many years. Now it is becoming a materialistic society.

2) We are under constant pressures in our society. The fact that an adult male must serve 40 days of the year, year after year, in reserve duty is a pressure on the family and the economy.

3) The borders are more open to consider the possibilities that exist outside of Israel.

4) There are always some who will be attracted to leave because they think the quality of life will be better somewhere else. (51)
When a former leader in the Histadrut was asked for his explanation of the emigration rate, he said:

Some youth are very idealistic. They serve in the army for three years and then they want to make money and be rich - or greedy. Maybe some start here, went abroad for studies, fell in love with a girl or a career and must now make a choice. The teacher Heroda said, "Each nation has its own mission or purpose. So each man needs a purpose in life." For some there is a period of searching...People have a tendency to immigrate (to Israel) when they suffer...the ability to defend yourself is very important. (52)

Smooha notes that the original vision of the Ashkenzai Jews saw that the path of development and unity necessitated the Oriental Jews becoming 'like them'. He added "What they do not realize is that many of the Israelis who are leaving the country are Ashkenzai Jews and the percentage of the Oriental community is increasing - and may go as high as 75 percent of the population within 20 years unless offset by new immigration patterns." National Identity and National Unity requires a minimum commitment that all three Jewish minority groups omit: A personal choice to physically live in Israel - as it exists - a secular, Jewish state.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the relationships of the non-Jewish minority groups to National Identity-National Unity. The conceptual model following indicates the primary non-Jewish minority groups within the pre-1967 Israeli borders are:

1) Druse - 42,000
2) Christians - 116,200 (including 36,00 in the 'West Bank') primarily Arabs.
3) Muslims - 411,400 - Israeli Arab citizens
TABLE 1

THE STATE OF ISRAEL: 1948-1973 - A 'SYSTEM' OF NATIONAL IDENTITY-NATIONAL UNITY

The 'Inner Core': Jewish Citizens

1 'Dati' im': Religious - (Observant - Orthodox) Jews
2 'M'sorati'im': Traditional - (Reformed - Conservative) Jews
3 'Lo dati' im: Non-religious - (Secular - Atheistic) Jews

The 'Outer Shell': Non-Jewish Citizens

4 Israeli Arabs (mainly Muslims)
5 Druze
6 Christians (mostly Arabs)

7 Arabs in 'Administrated Territories'

1973 POPULATION

1) 2,959,400 Jews
2) 411,400 Muslims
3) 42,000 Druze
4) 116,200 Christians
   (including 36,000 in 7)
5) 1,035,400 Arab Muslims
6) 4,568,400 Total

(a) a tiny group of religious Jews oppose the State of Israel (N'ture Karta)

A Conceptual Model
Prepared by J. Cunningham.
A fourth and larger group of Palestinian Arabs (1,035,400) live in the Administered Areas of Gaza and the West Bank of the Jordan River (see Appendix D). The researcher travelled to Gaza, Hebron, Nablus, Nazareth and the Golan and met a variety of individuals within the Muslim, Christian and Druse communities. It became apparent that the immensity of the topic of National Identity-National Unity, as viewed from the perspective of the non-Jewish minority groups, would require a separate dissertation. A decision was made, upon the recommendation of Dr. Eitan Israeli, with supportive endorsements by many of the primary personnel, to limit this study to the Israeli Jewish adult educators within the time period of 1948 to 1973. This decision was also approved by the OISE thesis committee.

In the accompanying model, Israel is likened to a solar system. Within such a 'system' there are unique component 'planets', represented as groupings or clusters of individuals with a strong central common element. This 'common element' holds the grouping together as it moves about and functions within the system. Factors such as nationality, or historical ties might have been chosen as a common element, but for this system the religious component will be considered the crucial unifying factor within a grouping. Each of the planets or groupings are in some manner associated, or identified with the focus of the larger system - the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. The outer limits of the system will 'geographically' be considered as the 1973 ceasefire lines.
Observations

The 'Inner Core' of Jewish citizens (1-2-3) represent the largest population group in Israel, and the ones with the strongest attachment to the on-going successful development of the Jewish State of Israel. Since Jewish immigrants are by constitutional decree the only ones permitted to move to Israel and obtain citizenship (The law of Return: 1950) - the Inner core is one segment of the system that has potential to in some manner 'legally expand'. The pattern of life and laws within the system are strongly, almost disproportionately affected or controlled through political coalitions by the 'religious-observant-Orthodox' segment of the Jewish population. For example, buses do not operate on Shabbat, Saturday is the national 'day off' (although it is also the religious holy day for the Jewish faithful), the emblem of the national flag is the Star of David, the national holidays follow the pattern of religious 'holy days', and the national language of Israel is the historical language of the 'People of the Book' - Hebrew.

The Bible is a popular book for all segments of Jewish society in Israel. For the 'dati'im' in group one (1) it is 'The Word of God'. For the 'm'sorati'im' in group two (2) it is the base of religious 'traditions' and for the 'lo dati'im' in group three (3) it is a source of history. (1a) represents the N'ture Karta, who oppose the formation of the State of Israel. However the overwhelming majority of the Jewish people are 'Zionists' in full support of the formation of the modern State of Israel in 1948.

The non-Jewish section of the system that are Israeli citizens includes: (i) Israeli Arabs, living in the State of Israel who gained citizenship as permanent residents of the land in 1948; (ii) Druze
and (iii) Christians - mainly Christian Arabs living within the State of Israel; 1948 borders. The Israeli Arabs (4) have strong 'legal' ties to the State of Israel as Israeli citizens. Being primarily of the Muslim faith they have a weaker pull towards identification with the Jewish traditions and observances within the State of Israel. The Druze (5) have a strong loyalty to the State of Israel, serving in the army (IDF) and exercising their full privileges as citizens. Yet they remain somewhat isolated and removed from the mainstream of Jewish life. Their physical settings in Golan and Mount Carmel keep them geographically isolated from most Jewish centers and activities. The Christians (mainly Arabs) are citizens 'between the hammer and the anvil'.

Subscribing to a religious faith in a Jewish Messiah, Rabbi Jesus of Nazareth, they are in abeyance with the Muslim community for having accepted a 'western religion'. However, by their coloring and heritage as Arabs, they are viewed with suspicion - as part of the larger 'Arab world' by the Jewish segment of the Israeli society. The Christian Arab is likely to have an emotional attachment to the State of Israel as the homeland of his Christian faith. The Muslim has stronger attachments to Mecca, Saudi Arabia and the wider Muslim 'community'.

The closer one moves to the 'core' of the system, the greater the tendency to become identified and united with the State of Israel. The further one moves away from the 'core' of the system, the greater the tendency to want to 'pull away' from the weakened gravitational pull of identification and unity with the State of Israel. The underlying goal and direction of adult education in Israel, within the Jewish community directly, and in the non-Jewish communities indirectly, is to
draw the individual citizen into a stronger identity and unity with the Jewish State of Israel. It appears from this model that a person's sense of identity and unity is in proportion to his/her: religious attachment to the land; acceptance of the historical Jewish claims to the land; and a sense of 'religious duty' or obligation to be 'on the land'.

The purpose of this chapter has been to review the contribution made to NI-NU by culture, religion and minority groups within the Jewish sector of Israeli society - as perceived and assessed by the primary personnel - and to set in focus certain dynamic factors within these areas, that impinge on the adult educators as they seek to develop National Identity - National Unity within the modern State of Israel.
CHAPTER V - Footnotes

Forces Within Israeli Culture Affecting NI-NU in Israel

1. Ora Grabelsky, personal interview, (57.3).
2. Ibid, (57.2).
4. Kalman Yaron, personal interview, (57.1).
5. Haim Hutner, personal interview, (57.4).
6. Sammy Smooha, personal interview, (57.9).
7. Ibid, (57.8).
8. Chaim Zippori, personal interview, (34.6).
9. Gershon Gil'ad, personal interview, (103.1).
10. Ibid, (103.3).
11. Ibid, (103.4).

Schmuel Adler is a civil servant. His parents were born in Poland, lived in Nazi Germany, and were among a select number admitted as immigrants to the USA in 1938. Schmuel was born in America, and arrived in Israel in 1960. He works for the Ministry of Immigration and Absorption. (p. 23.)

15. Sammy Smooha, op. cit., (110.5).
17. Yeheskiel Cohen, personal interview, (59.6).

Bernard Resnikoff is a social worker and spokesman of the American Jewish Committee in Israel. (p. 116).


The Contribution of Religion to NI-NU in Israel

22. Emanuel Gutmann, 'Religion and its Role in National Integration in Israel', Middle East Review, Fall, 1979, pp. 31-36.

Gutmann concludes his article by saying: "Religion plays a major role in nation-building and national integration in Israel, despite all the problems involved. Partly by accident of numbers (electoral strength) and the play of party politics based on it...religion is one of the elements of everyday politics...thereby levelling religion with other aspects of public life. And parallel with its integrative function, religion also serves as one more cleavage in Israeli society, with all the political implications of such a situation." p. 36.


23. Ibid, p. 31
24. Dr. Ben-Sason, personal interview, (108.3).
25. Gutmann, op. cit., p. 35.
27. Ibid, p. 73.
28. Simon Herman, Jewish Identity: A Social Psychological Perspective, (1977), states:

"Jews in Israel may be described as 'dati'im' (religious), 'm'sorati'im' (traditional) or 'lo dati'im' (nonreligious). In the Israeli context the terms relate to the degree of religious observance. 'dati' implies a strict observance of religious obligations; 'm'sorati' indicates a positive orientation to Jewish tradition accompanied by varying degrees
of laxity and selectivity in regard to observance, 'lo'datum' means non-observant, although customs may be honored."

"Religious students are the most frequent proponents of the view that their Israeli subidentity is a reinforcement of the Jewish subidentity and that an Israeli Jew is the more complete type of Jew." (p. 45.)

29. Jack Cohen, personal interview, (uncoded personal notes)
30. 'succhoth' or the 'Feast of Booths' is a time when the observant Jews build 'booths' of live branches, myrtle branches, palm branches, and other leafy trees to recall the time when the Children of Israel came up from the land of Egypt and lived in 'tents' in the desert on their way to the land of Israel. Certain fruits and special meals are to be eaten in the 'booth'. It is one of three major celebrations when representatives of each 'tribe' were to go up to Jerusalem, to present sacrifices at the Temple.
31. Ora Grabelsky, personal interview, (8.5).
32. Yeheskiel Cohen, personal interview, (8.3).
33. Kalman Yaron, personal interview, (49.1).
34. Ibid, (44.2).
35. Cohen, op. cit., (44.6-44.7).
36. Sammy Smooha, personal interview, (44.8).
37. Yona Ben-Sason, personal interview, (75.2).
38. Smooha, op. cit., (108.1).
41. Ibid, (47.3).
42. Ibid, (62.1).

The Relationship of Minority Groups to NI-NU in Israel

43. Smooha (1973), op. cit., p. 359.
45. Yaron, op. cit., (56.1).

46. Cohen, op. cit., (56.2).


49. Researcher's personal observation while visiting Mea Shearim.


Rates of emigration are difficult to accurately determine. The Israeli government takes the excess of departures over arrivals, and adjusts the figure to offset the return of emigrants even after a very long sojourn abroad. (p. 116).

51. Kalman Yaron, op. cit. (58.1).

52. Yehuda Gothelf, personal interview, (58.7. p. 9.).

53. Smooha, op. cit., (112.2).